On April 25, some 12,000 fighters from JNIM – a terrorist group affiliated with Al Qaeda – and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) launched coordinated attacks against the Malian capital, Bamako, and strategic cities such as Kidal, Gao, Mopti and Sévaré. Of the six simultaneous battles, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) prevailed in five. Among the most serious events are the deaths of countless civilians, the assassination of the Minister of Defense, Sadio Camara, and the fall of Kidal.
The alliance between the JNIM and the FLA is not unprecedented. Although they pursue different objectives, they already cooperated against the Army and its Russian allies in the battle of Tinzaouatène. Now they have repeated that pattern: a tactical and temporary alliance based on common enemies, the weakening of the Bamako Junta and the expulsion of foreign actors. This convergence reproduces dynamics seen in 2012, where local grievances and state fragility fueled cycles of violence.
In September 2025, the United Arab Emirates paid $50 million to the JNIM to free an Emirati tycoon and a wave of violence broke out in October. Two months later, the group received another 20 million in similar ransoms. Added to this was the visit, weeks before the latest escalation, of the opponent Oumar Mariko to negotiate the release of 17 hostages. These flows reinforce a perverse cycle: each rescue strengthens the JNIM, encourages new kidnappings and fuels the insurgency.
The response of the Assimi Goïta Board was quick. The FAMa, supported by the Russian Africa Corps and its allies in the Alliance of Sahel States – Burkina Faso and Niger – carried out bombing raids in Kidal, Gao and Ménaka, while a joint force of 15,000 troops launched ground counteroffensives. In Bamako and Kati, clean-up operations were carried out against infiltrated cells and the Government began purges against suspected officers. Despite some progress, the loss of territorial control or the strategic initiative of the insurgency has not been reversed.
Although the crisis deteriorated Russia’s image as a guarantor of security in Africa, the Kremlin reaffirmed its permanence in Mali, presented the offensive as a “Western-sponsored coup attempt” and pointed to kyiv, Paris and Yamoussoukro as actors involved. These accusations gained weight after statements by French journalist Georges Malbrunot, who stated that France would support covert operations through Ukrainian units of its intelligence service and former French legionnaires. The controversy over the French involvement increased due to the media presence, without a reply from the Junta, of the FLA spokesperson. In parallel, Burkina Faso has redirected its trade towards the Ghanaian port of Tema, to the detriment of Abidjan, with losses estimated at 190.6 million euros. This scenario reflects how geopolitical narratives and regional tensions amplify the Malian crisis.
The evolution of the conflict in Mali remains uncertain and no scenario can be predicted. However, it would be wrong to consider the State defeated. The battle of Tinzaouatène or the blockade at the end of 2025 – in which Bamako managed to contradict the most pessimistic forecasts – showed a remarkable capacity for resilience. Beyond political or geopolitical considerations, those responsible for the destabilization in the Sahel continue to be the jihadist groups. And they are the real enemies.
