The International Crisis Group has identified three African conflicts among the ten most critical globally that, after a violence-ridden 2025, are expected to continue and receive the most attention in 2026. The ICG’s list of conflicts to watch includes those affecting Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as Mali and Burkina Faso.
International Crisis Group is an independent think tank () that investigates and warns about crises and violent conflicts around the world to help prevent wars and promote peaceful solutions. Each year, it prepares lists of the most important conflicts to monitor due to their possible humanitarian, regional and global security effects, as well as the risk of escalation or lasting consequences if action is not taken in time.
In its latest report of 10 conflicts to watch in 2026, ICG specifically includes Sudan, the very tense Ethiopia-Eritrea link and the conflicts in Mali and Burkina Faso, because these scenarios present crises with high potential for violence, serious humanitarian impact and the capacity to destabilize entire regions if there is no effective attention and management. Below is a summary of the situation in each country:
Sudan
The civil war in Sudan broke out on April 15, 2023 due to an internal confrontation within the military that had taken power after a coup d’état in 2021. It pits the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the official army, against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group that emerged in Darfur and led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). Both groups fight to control the country. Until now they have faced each other in different strategic regions such as Darfur and in large cities such as Wad Madani or El Obeid, in addition to the capital Khartoum. In practice, Sudan is divided in two with each group controlling a part of the territory.
As a result of this confrontation, millions of people have had to abandon their homes throughout the country, which constitutes one of the largest displacement crises in the world. In addition, bombings and attacks, often with drones, have killed hundreds of civilians. Cities like El Fasher have been left virtually deserted after being the scene of massacres and intense combat. Finally, this war has generated extreme levels of food insecurity, malnutrition and disorganization of basic services such as education and health.
UNESCO, for its part, is alarmed by the massive destruction and looting of cultural heritage in Sudan due to armed conflict, with reports of looting at the National Museum in Khartoum and other sites. This has led the organization to warn the art market about the illicit trafficking of antiquities, highlighting the risk of irreparable loss of Sudanese identity and the need to protect sites such as the Pyramids of Meroe.
The lack of political agreement between both parties, the division of power between the two forces, without mutual trust or solid incentives to negotiate, and with the interference of external interests from countries such as the United Arab Emirates or Russia complicate any clear solution to the conflict.
All of this leads ICG to affirm that there is a real risk of escalation and extension of the conflict. The violence could even spread to neighboring countries and further complicate regional peace efforts.
Ethiopia and Eritrea
The enmity between both countries goes back a long way, including a long war that ended in 2000 and a fierce border conflict. In 2000, they signed the Algiers Peace Agreement, although many issues remained unresolved. In 2018, after the appointment of Abiy Ahmed Ali as prime minister, there was a rapprochement between the two nations, with the opening of borders and improvement of relations that lasted a few years. Facts that influenced the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Ali in 2019.
In recent years, tensions between the two countries have increased. When Eritrea became independent in 1993, Ethiopia was left without an outlet to the sea. The Ethiopian prime minister has repeatedly stated in recent years that his country needs access to the Red Sea, something that Eritrea perceives as a direct threat to its sovereignty. As a result, both sides have deployed troops near the border, and there are signs of military mobilization and preparations that worry experts and international institutions. Furthermore, the tone of official speeches has become belligerent, with public insults and mutual threats between the two countries.
The war in the Tigray region (between November 2020 and November 2022) has also been an indirect driver of tensions. Eritrea intervened militarily alongside Ethiopian federal forces in that war and did not completely withdraw after the peace agreement. This has created resentment both within Ethiopia and among Tigrayan groups, complicating international relations between both countries and could trigger new indirect clashes.
Although a formal war has not yet been declared, several international analysts place this relationship among those most at risk of erupting into a full-scale conflict due to: the lack of resolution of long-standing border issues, the access to the sea sought by Ethiopia, the militarization of borders, the possibility of internal Ethiopian conflicts spilling outwards, and the increase in hostile rhetoric among leaders.
An escalation of these tensions could further destabilize the Horn of Africa, where there are already other hotspots of violence and fragility.
Mali and Burkina Faso
The situation in the Sahel, especially in Mali and Burkina Faso, is a multidimensional crisis that combines armed conflicts, political insecurity, humanitarian crises and massive displacements. That is precisely one of the reasons why ICG considers it a source of instability that must be closely watched in 2026.
In Mali, armed jihadist groups, such as Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)—linked to Al Qaeda—and factions of the Islamic State have increased attacks against state forces and civilians. This has even led to the siege of the capital, Bamako, and a significant increase in civilian and military targets. In various parts of the country, these groups control large rural areas and impose their authority by force.
For its part, the ruling military junta, led by Assimi Goïta, has followed an antidemocratic drift after the 2021 coup, restricting political parties and strengthening ties with external actors such as Russia for security support. These dynamics have generated internal tensions and weakened the legitimacy of the State in the face of an increasingly vulnerable population.
The violence has caused thousands of deaths, internal displacement and food security crises, with millions of people in need of basic assistance.
Burkina Faso faces an armed insurgency that began years ago and has intensified with groups such as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and other cross-border factions also operating in Mali and Niger. This violence has led to deadly attacks on civilian communities – such as the Solenzo massacre in 2025 or the Nondin and Soro massacre in 2024 – carried out by militias or pro-government forces in retaliation and in which hundreds of civilians died.
A military junta, under the leadership of Captain Ibrahim Traoré, has ruled the country since October 2022. However, state control beyond the capital and large urban centers remains weak, with large areas under the control of armed groups or permanent insecurity.
All of this has caused the forced displacement of more than two million people and a major shortage of food and basic services.
Across the central Sahel region, the combination of insecurity, state weakness, humanitarian crisis and mass displacement makes the situation one of the most complex and urgent in Africa.
In short, these three crises, in addition to their intrinsic severity, can intensify if prevention, diplomatic mediation and humanitarian response are not prioritized. They affect millions of people, generate forced displacement and human rights violations and alter the security balance on the continent and beyond, with possible repercussions on migratory flows, extremist networks and interstate tensions.
Otherwise, they run the risk of overflowing and becoming not only a regional but also an international challenge.
