For years, drones were the symbol of a distant war, typical of great powers and remote conflicts. Its use was associated with United States military operations in the Middle East or highly technological conflicts. Today, that image has changed significantly. In Africa, more and more countries are incorporating these devices into their military strategies, transforming not only the way they fight, but also the balance of power on the continent.
What until recently was an exclusive technology has become accessible. And with it, war has also changed. In countries such as Ethiopia, Mali or Nigeria, drones have ceased to be a secondary tool and have become a central element of military operations. They allow large areas of territory to be monitored, objectives to be identified with greater precision and, in some cases, attacks to be carried out without the need to deploy troops on the ground. But it also generates new technological dependencies, ethical dilemmas and forms of external influence.
In this context, some analysts speak of a kind of “democratization of violence”: technology reduces the barriers to exercising force and allows states with fewer resources to access capabilities previously reserved for large armies. This transformation does not necessarily imply greater stability; On the contrary, it can facilitate the resort to force and alter political incentives in conflict contexts.
The change has been rapid. In the mid-2010s, drones were primarily used for surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence gathering. Today, many of these systems are armed and capable of executing precision strikes. This evolution has been possible thanks to cost reduction, the proliferation of technology in the global market and the emergence of new suppliers willing to export it.
Countries such as Türkiye, China and Iran have played a key role in this process. Unlike Western powers, these actors tend to impose fewer political conditions or restrictions on the sale of weapons, which has facilitated the rapid spread of drones in different African countries. Beyond a simple commercial transaction, these relationships also imply strategic links that reinforce the presence of these actors on the continent.
One of the most illustrative examples of the impact of drones is the Tigray war, in Ethiopia, between 2020 and 2022. In this conflict, the use of drones by the Ethiopian government was decisive in recovering the military initiative against the forces of the Tigray Popular Liberation Front. The ability to locate targets, attack with precision and obtain information in real time made it possible to compensate for disadvantages on the ground and change the balance of the conflict.
In the Sahel, the phenomenon takes on different, but equally relevant, characteristics. In Mali, after the expulsion of the French military presence, the Government, with the help of Russia, has sought new allies and has reinforced its military capabilities, including the incorporation of drones. This technology initially made it possible to intensify pressure on jihadist groups operating in the country.
However, the results have been ambiguous. The recent intensification of attacks by various armed actors – including the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and the Azawad Liberation Front – has called into question the effectiveness of this strategy. Beyond the military level, the use of drones has also raised concerns about potential abuses, human rights violations, lack of transparency, and difficulties in holding accountable in contexts where oversight is limited.
In Nigeria, the use of drones has followed a different logic. There, these devices have been used mainly for surveillance tasks in the fight against Boko Haram and other armed groups. They have contributed to improving the coordination of security forces and reducing operational uncertainty, but they have not been sufficient to resolve a complex and protracted conflict.
Meanwhile, an emerging phenomenon is beginning to gain importance: the adoption of drones by non-state actors. Although their use is still limited and less sophisticated than that of States, there is evidence that some armed groups have begun to incorporate modified commercial drones into their operations.
In Nigeria, factions such as Boko Haram or its splinter ISWAP have used low-cost drones for reconnaissance tasks. In Mozambique, insurgent groups in the Cabo Delgado region have shown growing interest in these technologies, although their use has so far been rudimentary and in many cases propaganda-oriented.
Similar trends are observed in the Sahel – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. At the moment, this is limited experimentation. However, experience from other conflicts, such as those in the Middle East, suggests that these capabilities can evolve rapidly.
If this trend continues, the technological gap between states and insurgent groups could narrow. It will not disappear, but it will narrow enough to modify the dynamics of the confrontations and complicate the response of governments.
This new scenario raises important dilemmas. On the one hand, drones allow for more precise operations and reduce risk to military forces. On the other hand, they do not eliminate the danger of civilian casualties or resolve the underlying problems that fuel conflicts. Furthermore, the physical distance that they introduce in the use of force can contribute to a certain dehumanization of war.
A recent example illustrates the magnitude of these risks. In Sudan, where the war has entered its fourth year, at least 880 civilians have been killed by drone strikes between January and April 2026, according to data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. These deaths represent more than 80% of the total civilian victims recorded in that period.
Added to this is an additional problem: opacity. Many drone operations are carried out without detailed public information, making accountability difficult and fueling public mistrust. The head of the organization, Volker Türk, has warned that the conflict could enter an even more lethal phase.
There are also geopolitical implications. The dependence on external suppliers for the acquisition, maintenance and operation of these systems gives countries such as Türkiye, China or Iran growing influence on the African continent. It’s not just about technology, but about strategic relationships that can have long-term effects.
Ultimately, drones are not a solution to African conflicts. They do not address the structural causes of violence—such as institutional weakness, inequality, or territorial tensions—but they do alter the way these conflicts develop.
They make war more accessible, more technological and, in many cases, more difficult to control. And, above all, they show that the future of conflicts is no longer decided solely on the ground, but also from the air.
War from the sky is no longer exclusive to the great powers. Africa is today one of the scenarios where what this means is best understood.
