In his first year back in the White House, Donald Trump has made a profound turn in United States foreign policy. His style – quick decisions, strong messages and an execution that often borders on institutional limits – has reordered priorities and has returned ideas that seemed outdated to the center of the debate. Among them, the logic of spheres of influence, a concept typical of the 19th century that reappears in new forms.
Trump has openly vindicated the Monroe Doctrine, which in the 19th century defended that the Western Hemisphere should be free of European interference. The president has renamed it the “Donroe Doctrine,” an expanded version that presents the United States as the exclusive guarantor of security in America. The idea connects with a broader framework: a world divided into large spaces dominated by regional powers.
Their decisions and statements have not only modified American foreign action but have forced the rest of international actors to constantly react to Washington’s changes in course. According to this logic, the world is organized into areas of influence and the United States, as the “hegemon” of the Western Hemisphere, would have legitimacy to act freely within its region.
Spheres of influence: from Schmitt to China
This notion is reminiscent of the concept of “great space” (Grossraum) formulated by the German philosopher Carl Schmitt, who argued that the international order is organized around powers that exert influence over entire regions.
Although Schmitt is a controversial figure due to his links with Nazism, his theory has been indirectly recovered by some Chinese intellectuals to explain the rise of the country and its role in the Asia-Pacific. Recent studies analyze how China articulates its influence through investment, diplomacy and military presence in its regional environment.
This approach also serves to question the thesis of political scientist Francis Fukuyama, who in the 1990s stated that the fall of the USSR meant the “end of history” and the definitive victory of liberalism. The evolution of China, Russia and now the United States points rather to a return to competition between great powers.
The American vision was captured in the 2025 National Security Strategy, which consolidates a division of the world into blocks: the United States in the Western Hemisphere, Russia in its immediate neighborhood, and China in the Asia-Pacific.
The document represents a break with the post-war liberal order, based on universal rules and multilateral institutions, and is committed to a more territorial and hierarchical logic.
From Monroe to “Donroe”: hemispheric exclusivity in a 21st century key
Trump’s foreign policy has moved in similar coordinates to China’s, although with different foundations. Two recent episodes illustrate this logic: the US intervention in Venezuela and the interest in the possible purchase or annexation of Greenland under the pretext of national security. Both cases are based on the idea that the United States has the right to act freely within its area of influence.
But we do not only have those two examples, in this last year there have been more actions, such as attacks against alleged drug trafficking ships in the Caribbean, pressure on Panama for the management of the canal that Trump wants to recover, new sanctions on Nicaragua and stricter restrictions on Cuba or the reinforcement of his relationship with Nayib Bukele in El Salvador in exchange for cooperation on immigration matters.
All of these actions respond to the same idea: the United States has the right to act freely within its area of influence and to prevent the strategic presence of external powers. The “Donroe Doctrine” formalizes this vision and makes it the axis of American foreign policy.
The clash between the international agenda and domestic expectations
However, this external strategy cannot be understood without looking inward. The dialectic of the Trump administration contrasts with the priorities of many of the voters who brought him to the White House in 2024. Their support was based on a clear diagnosis: previous administrations had betrayed the average American.
According to the president’s rhetoric, globalization deindustrialized the country, widened social gaps and strengthened strategic rivals. The elites – both Republican and Democrat – would have ignored these problems, causing the impoverishment of the common citizen.
Therefore, the political viability of the “Donroe Doctrine” will be measured in the midterm elections. Trump controls all three branches of government, but his majority in the House of Representatives is extraordinarily narrow – the slimmest in almost a century. The success of your international agenda will only be valued positively if voters perceive improvements in their quality of life. If the economy suffers or purchasing power falls, the fruits of this attempt to reorder the international system will have to be sought elsewhere.
Meanwhile, it is worth following those who have conceptually analyzed this shift – among them, the American writer and economist Benn Steil – to understand a change that, for the first time in decades, is not limited to rhetoric, but reconfigures the real distribution of power.
Aurken Sierra Iso, Doctor Assistant, Department of Public Communication, University of Navarra
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original.
