The presidential elections held on October 25 in Côte d’Ivoire, in which Alassane Ouattara was re-elected for a fourth term with 89.77% of the votes, are a paradigmatic example of what political science calls hybrid regimes. These systems combine formal democratic institutions – elections, parties, courts – with authoritarian practices that place them in a gray zone between the two.
In this context, the last vote should be interpreted less as a pluralist exercise than as the consolidation of a political model based on institutional control, the exclusion of adversaries and the technocratic management of power. Ouattara’s own candidacy illustrates the nature of the process: the constitutional reinterpretation that allowed his fourth term followed the logic observed in other African countries – Benin, Togo or Cameroon – where these limits have been eroded. It was not a neutral legal debate, but a political decision of the Constitutional Council, which privileged the presidential will over the spirit of the Magna Carta of 2016. The official narrative of the “reset” of the constitutional counter was supported by a flexible legal apparatus and a system of control over administrative and judicial elites.
The result was an electoral process without real alternation. The exclusion of 55 of the 60 registered candidates cannot be considered a simple administrative purge, but rather a deliberate mechanism to eliminate competition. The disqualifications of Laurent Gbagbo and Tidjane Thiam, the only opponents with the capacity to articulate a credible challenge, confirm this logic. In the case of Gbagbo, acquitted by the CFI, judicial sentences were reactivated that show the political instrumentalization of justice. In Thiam’s case, the notion of an identity doctrine used historically to exclude, even Ouattara himself in the year 2000, reappeared.
The tensions resulted in pre-election protests, bans on demonstrations and mass arrests. Although the election day passed “globally calm”, there were incidents in opposition strongholds and participation close to 50%, with abstention peaks of over 80% in some areas.
This political scenario coexists with an economic paradox. Since 2011, Côte d’Ivoire has recorded average growth of 7% annually, driven by cocoa, cashews and large infrastructure projects. This second “Ivorian miracle” has reinforced Ouattara’s image as an efficient technocrat. However, growth has not been inclusive: a third of the population lives below the poverty line, public debt is increasing and youth unemployment is structural. This gap fuels a latent malaise and explains the desire to leave the country. In 2023 there were 19,000 irregular arrivals of Ivorians to Europe, 164% more than in 2022, according to IOM data. Added to this are misinformation and the circulation of fake news about military interventions.
The elections show a structural tension: economic growth with a democratic deficit, macroeconomic stability in the face of growing social frustration and political continuity without guarantees of succession. The official promise of a “generational transition” contrasts with the absence of a defined heir in Ouattara’s party and a weakened opposition. In a regional context marked by the fracture between the Atlantic States – such as Ivory Coast – and the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States, governed by military junta, the main risk for Ivorian governability cannot be the indefinite prolongation of the power of a single man.
