On May 28, 1975, in Lagos (Nigeria), the Economic Community of West Africa (CEDEAO) was born with a clear objective: to promote economic integration as a way for regional development. 50 years later, his career reflects undeniable achievements, deep contradictions and growing challenges that call into question his future.
The creation of CEDEAO was the result of an ideological struggle between two visions for Africa. On the one hand, the Monrovia group defended a gradual economic cooperation between sovereign states, maintaining colonial borders. On the other, the Casablanca group promoted an immediate political union under the ideal of the “United States of Africa.” This confrontation had consequences. In the decade prior to Independence (1950-1962), Pan-Africanist leaders such as the ivory Victor Biaka Wedding or Nigerino Djibo Bakary were physically or politically eliminated, racing the path to a more moderate integration model that would not challenge the old metropolis.
Among its greatest achievements, the free circulation of people has been since 1979, which allows millions of citizens to move without visa through the region. In 2015 it established a customs union and in 2019 it promoted the project of a regional currency, the echo. In the political sphere, CEDEAO has played a key role in regional stabilization. It acts as an electoral and mediator in political crises with a discourse of defense of the constitutional order. Its military force, the ECOMOG, intervened in conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 90s, and in 2017 managed to solve the Gambiana’s post -election crisis without violence. In addition, CEDEAO is attractive, since, since February 2017, Morocco tries to be admitted to it.
However, the organization faces structural challenges. Nigeria, which represented 53.79 % of regional GDP and 51.67 % of its population in 2023, exerts a disproportionate influence, generating imbalances in decision making. Likewise, about 72 % of its budget depends on external donors (European Union and France), which limits its autonomy and feeds perceptions of acting as an instrument of interests. His performance in recent crises has been inconsistent: while showing firmness in Gambia (2017) and Niger (2023), he was ambiguous in Guinea (2021) and Burkina Faso (2022) and ignored electoral fraud in Togo and Ivory Coast. This lack of coherence erodes its credibility, as evidenced by the recent departure of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in 2024, countries that formed the Sahel states alliance (AES), accusing the transfer of serving neocolonial agendas. Mauritania had already left the organization in 2000.
As the analyst Ebenezer Obadare points out, CEDEAO is, after the EU, one of the most successful examples of regional integration. However, its current model, characterized by rigid hierarchies, external dependence and double standards, seems outdated in a region that demands deep changes. To survive, it must be reinvented as an institution at the service of its peoples, not of the elites. This implies deepening internal democracy, creating a regional parliament or other agencies with a real elected representation, reducing its external financing dependence, prioritizing dialogue on punitive sanctions and accelerating the transition from Franco CFA to the echo or supporting national coins. The next few years will be decisive to determine if the CEDEAO can adapt to the demands of a more sovereign and equitable West Africa.
