The nth political crisis between Salva Kiir and Riek Machar puts the country again in a critical situation
By Nicola Bazia Bugos From Yuba (South Sudan)
South Sudan, independent of Sudan in 2011 after two decades of civil war, is in the precipice due to another conflict that began at the end of March 2025, when the climbing of tensions between the president, Salva Kiir, and the first vice president, Riek Machar, threatened to undo the fragile revitalized agreement for the resolution of the conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), signed in 2018. March tensions, which led to the house arrest of Machar, have not only destabilized the transitory government of the National Unity, but have also triggered a withdrawal of the foreign diplomatic presence.
The R-ARCSS, signed to end a civil war that caused the death of almost 400,000 people, established a government of shared power with Kiir as president and Machar as first vice president. However, the application of the agreement has been hindered by mutual distrust and delays in key provisions. Tensions exploded in February 2025, when clashes in the state of Alto Nilo between the defense forces of the South Sudan people (SSPDF) and the White Army, aligned with the Nueres and linked to the Liberation Movement of the Sudanese People in Opposition (SPLM-IO), Machar, caused 21 dead and thousands of displaced.
On March 26, 2025, a convoy of 20 vehicles, headed by the Minister of Defense, entered the residence of Machar in Yuba, disarmed his bodyguards and put them to him and his wife, Interior Minister, Angelina Tey, under house arrest, accused of incitement to rebellion. This action has “questioned the application of the agreement and the legality of the forced house arrest,” says Mad Gabriel, a south -south -year -old political analyst. The SPLM-IO condemned the measure as a “flagrant violation” of the R-ARCSS. The Kiir government confirmed the arrest two days later, claiming that Machar was stirring the civil war to disrupt the elections, now postponed to December 2026.
The arrest of Machar marks a critical break in the relationship between the two main South American politicians, which has oscillated between uncomfortable cooperation and an open conflict since the Civil War of 2013. The measures taken by Kiir, including the appointment of Benjamin Bol Mel – a consolidate power to the detriment of Machar. Gabriel warns that replacing the first vice president, as tried in 2016, when he fled Yuba and broke out a civil war, can “endanger the agreement.”
A stagnant process
The reform of the security sector and electoral preparations, critical components of the R-ARCSS, are stagnant. Gabriel highlights Kiir’s statement that the UN embargo of arms since 2018 hinders the integration of opposition forces into the SSPDF, while the SPLM -io blames Kiir of the lack of financing of the process. “The parties aligned with Kiir lack interest in the reform, concerned only with benefiting from this collapsed system,” says the analyst, who points to a similar disinterest by the SPLM-IO, among others.
They also worry about electoral delays. The postponement of the elections as of December 2026, announced in 2024, includes incomplete tasks such as census and voting record. Gabriel argues that this reflects a “pattern of a decade of political delays” to maintain the status quo, as seen in the non -applied agreement of 2015. The peace rhetoric of both parties hides actions that perpetuate the stagnation and undermine the transition period, which ends in February 2027.
Embassy closure
The current context has also tensioned the diplomatic ties of South Sudan, with the temporary closure of the German embassy on March 22, 2025, which followed, on April 17, the permanent closure of the Netherlands delegation, in both cases as a sign of protest for the intransigence of the government. Mad Gabriel points out that South Sudan leaders “lack political will to apply the peace agreement due to greed and poor management.” The three extensions of the transitory period, he adds, have convinced allies as Germany that “the government does not want to celebrate elections.” These closures threaten the entry of aid, fundamental for 9.3 million people – 69 % of the population – who need assistance. The reduction of personnel at the American embassy, which was reported in April 2025, further reduces the prospects for donors to commit to the country again.
The survival of the R-ARCSS hangs from a thread, since Sudan of the South runs the risk of suffering a new civil war. To explain this, Gabriel cites the continuous clashes in Unity, Alto Nilo and Ecuador significant »and make the distribution of power unfeasible, says Gabriel.
The postponement of the elections is considered a tactic to extend power, which further erodes the confidence of all actors. Gabriel warns that unresolved problems – economic crisis, military disputes and the tactic of the stick and kiir carrot against the opposition – could revive the violence of 2016, with the resistance of loyal to the replacement of Machar feeding the conflict.
To avoid collapse, Gabriel proposes the celebration of an inclusive conference with the participation of political forces, civil society and opposition groups of the Rome platform with the aim of setting an electoral calendar. The history of transition governments failed in South Sudan since 2011 makes this change necessary. “The absence of elections from Independence shows that the distribution of power has failed,” he argues. A technocratic government, with the mandate to supervise the elections and dissolve after the elections, could break the cycle. The regional actors – such as the IGAD – or the UN should sponsor and mediate in this conference, overcoming the resistance of the national unity government factions that cling to power.
South Sudan faces three scenarios: a reactivation of the R-ARCSS, unlikely given the consolidation of Kiir; the stagnation or continuation of the violence of low profile, more likely; or the civil war, fed by ethnic tensions and regional interference. The proposal of an inclusive conference opens some hope, but requires unprecedented cooperation. Without it, South Sudan runs the risk of being isolated, with help cuts that would aggravate their humanitarian crisis: 7.1 million people face food insecurity and bring the country closer to collapse.
