Russia, China and the United States have turned energy into a global power chessboard, and Europe has found itself right in the center of that game. The combination of a possible early cut-off of Russian gas, Chinese restrictions linked to the conflict in the Persian Gulf and Donald Trump’s threats on trade and liquefied natural gas (LNG) that reaches our ports paints a scenario of an energy “triple ultimatum” for the European continent.
Russia: restrict supply
The first movement comes from Moscow. The European Union has been approving sanctions for years and designing a gradual disconnection from Russian gas: restrictions on new LNG contracts from 2026 and an almost total veto on gas via gas pipeline until 2027.
Faced with this calendar, Vladimir Putin has decided to get ahead. In several public interventions he has hinted that Russia is considering cutting off the supply before the EU definitively closes the door, with a simple logic: “If they are going to stop buying from us in a few months, it is better for us to decide when the relationship ends.”
At the same time, the Kremlin accelerates the Asian shift, the great pole of hydrocarbon demand, which largely depends on the oil that crosses the Strait of Hormuz.
China: guarantee its reserves
The second movement comes from Beijing. The escalation between the United States, Israel and Iran has put Hormuz at the center of all alarms: around a fifth of the oil traded in the world passes through that strait.
China, which imports millions of barrels a day from the Gulf, has reacted quickly: it has ordered its large refineries to suspend gasoline and diesel exports, cancel contracts and stop signing new agreements, with a very clear priority: guaranteeing domestic supply in the face of the possibility of a partial or total closure of Hormuz.
This closing of the tap to the outside world reduces the global supply of refined fuels and contributes to pushing up the prices that Europe pays, reopening the debate on its energy vulnerability.
American LNG, instrument of power
The third movement comes from Washington and hits Spain directly. In recent years, American LNG has become one of the pillars of Spanish supplies: according to the most recent data from February 2026, around 44% of the gas consumed in Spain comes from the United States, a proportion that has been increasing after the drastic reduction in purchases from Russia.
That weight makes LNG a tool of political influence. Following the refusal of the Spanish Government to allow the use of the Rota and Morón bases in a possible operation against Iran, President Trump has raised his tone to the point of threatening to cut off commercial relations, in a context in which gas is part of the package. The possibility that its supply could be used as leverage adds an additional element of uncertainty to our energy security.
Spain has the infrastructure
On this board, Spain occupies a paradoxical position. On the one hand, it is one of the European countries with the greatest regasification capacity: seven plants in operation and a relatively meshed gas network turn the Spanish territory into a privileged gateway for LNG, which can then be reshipped to other European markets.
This infrastructure is a strategic advantage for the EU, which sees in the Iberian Peninsula a possible hub energy to diversify its sources of supply.
But, on the other hand, as long as interconnections with France remain limited, that same architecture makes it especially sensitive to the fluctuations of the global LNG market and the decisions of actors such as the United States or Qatar.
Europe’s options
What can Europe – and Spain in particular – do in the face of this triple ultimatum?
In the short term, the options include strengthening joint gas purchasing mechanisms, better coordinating the use of strategic reserves and accelerating interconnection projects that allow full use of Spanish regasification capacity for the benefit of the entire internal market.
In the medium and long term, the debate inevitably returns to the table: accelerate the implementation of renewables, deploy storage – pumped hydraulics, batteries, hydrogen – and advance in energy efficiency. At the moment, they are the only ways to structurally reduce vulnerability to shocks external.
European energy autonomy
The European case helps to visualize something that is often diluted in big figures: behind every decision by Moscow, Beijing or Washington there is a direct impact on the electricity bill, on the budget of a neighborhood bar or on the viability of a factory on the outskirts of Barcelona or Bilbao.
Understanding how these pieces are connected – Russian gas, Hormuz, military bases, US LNG, China, Europe, Spanish regasification plants – is a necessary step to participate in an informed manner in the debate about what energy model and what degree of strategic autonomy Europe wants to build if it does not want others to continue deciding for it.
Armando Alvares Garcia Júnior, Professor of International Law and International Relations, UNIR – International University of La Rioja
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original.
